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STUDENT NOTES
trial would be obligatory upon the court. However, this question of
the effect of the statute has never been before the court as the desire
to waive the jury has always been mutual between the parties until
the accused found that the judge had decided for the state.
In the absence of statute it must be concluded that the effect of
the motion by the defendant to waive the jury is to place the burden
upon the court to determine the expediency of such a procedure.
However, no case has been found holding that the defendant is in a
position to demand a trial by the court. Likewise, no case has been
found where the court sustained the defendant's motion for a trial
without a jury over the objection of the state's attorney. The fol-
lowing cases hold that the court is correct in sustaining the objection
to the motion to waive: Morrison v. State, supra; State v. Mead, supra;
Ickes v. State, supra. The cases generally agree that the court has
the final word in determining the right to waive the jury trial in
criminal cases. This is best expressed by the words of Justice Suther-
land in the case of Patton v. United States, supra, at p. 312, "The duty
of the trial court in determining a motion of waiver of jury is not
discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised dis-
cretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departure from
that mode of trial". This in its last analysis means that the judge
must be certain that a trial by the court in the patricular case will
be just as expedient as a jury trial before the older method will be
dispensed with.
H. C. SrrH.
CARRn-as-LrITATioN oF AcTIONS For RECOVERY OF OVERCHARGES
ix KENTUCKY.
For the past few years the principal railroads of Kentucky have
declined to pay bona fide claims for overcharges on Kentucky intra-
state shipments unless such claims are presented within two years
from the date of delivery of the shipments. Formerly these claims
were paid if filed within five years. No recent decision of the courts
or modification of the statutes has been cited in support of this change
of position by the carriers. Numerous complaints have been voiced
by shippers whose claims have been rejected on this ground, but thus
far no action involving this point has been decided by the Court of
Appeals.
As used herein the term "overcharges" is confined to charges in
excess of rates lawfully established and filed with the Railroad Com-
mission as provided by Section 201g-3 of the Kentucky Statutes.
There appears to be no question but that the two year limitation period
provided in Section 819 of the Statutes is applicable to actions brought
under Sections 816 (extortion), 817 (discrimination), 818 (preference),
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and 820 (long-and-short haul statute). The leading case sustaining
this view is Louisville & Nashvile 1. 1. Co. v. Walker.
In order to determine when claims for overcharges are barred by
limitation it is necessary first to consider the nature of the action or
actions which may be maintained for the recovery of such overpay-
ments. The solicitor of a prominent railroad of the stdte, in answer
to an inquiry from a shipper, recently wrote: "An overcharge claim
is based upon the violation of a statute which now requires tariffs
to be published and filed with the Railroad Commission and which
likewise requires tariffs and rates so published to be observed. A
carrier charging more or less than the published tariff rate does so in
violation of this statute."
From this statement it seems that the carriers are of the opinion
that actions for the collection of overcharges must be brought under
Section 201g-6 of the Statutes, and that the two year limitation pro-
vid6d in Section 201g-17 will apply to such sections. It is to be noted,
however, that the Act of which* these sections are a part also con-
tains Section 201g-18, which reads: 'The rights, privileges and reme-
dies herein prescribed shall not be in lieu of, but in addition to the
rights, privileges and remedies now existing in such cases under the
statutes or the common law."
The question thus arises-were existing common law and statutory
remedies saved by Section 201g-18, and if so, what are these remedies?
No Kentucky cases have been found which bear directly upon this
point. In Southern y. Co. v. Frankfort Distillery Co.? Commissioner
Stanley, speaking for the court, said: "A common law action lies to
recover a sum charged in excess of scheduled rates, and no prior ap-
plication to the Railroad Commission or other body is necessary."
Since this statement was not material to the issues Involved and as no
pertinent cases were cited in support thereof, it must be considered
as dictum.
Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act 3 contains a saving
clause which is substantially the same as Section 201g-18 of the Ken-
tucky Statutes. This clause has been the subject of numerous deci-
sions of the federal and state courts. Briefly, these decisions have
held that existing common law and statutory remedies are not saved
by Section 22, when the continuance of these remedies would be in-
consistent with the several provisions of the act, but that they are
saved in so far as they do not conflict with the act. To illustrate, in
Texas & Pacific By. Go. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 0o. it was held that a
commonlaw action could not be maintained in a state court for dam-
ages alleged to have been caused by the charging of an unreasonable
tariff rate on an interstate shipment. The court said that the" reason-
ableness of a lawfully published rate was an administrative question
1110 Ky. 961, 63 S. W. 20, (1901).
2233 Ky. 771, 26 S. W. (2d) 1025, (1930).
'49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1.
204 U. S. 426, 51 Law. Ed. 553, (1907).
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which should be presented originally to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. To the same effect is Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. C6o., 5
where the published rate was alleged to be discriminatory.
But in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co.6 it was
held that an action for damages caused by the railroad's failure to
furnish cars for interstate coal shipments could be maintained in a
state court, because no administrative question was involved. With
respect to the saving clause, the court said: "That fbroviso was added
at the end of the statute, not to nullify other parts of the act, or to
defeat rights or remedies given by preceding sections, but to preserve
all existing rights which were not inconsistent with those created by
the statute."
Does an action for the recovery of overcharges present an ad-
ministrative question or merely a question of law? In Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.." the carrier contended that an action
for the recovery of charges in excess of published rates on interstate
shipments could not be maintained in a state court until the Interstate
Commerce Commission had passed upon the disputed question of con-
struction. The court denied the contention and said: "What construc-
tion shall be given to a railroad tariff presents ordinarily a question
of law which does not differ in character from those presented when
the construction of any other document is in dispute. When the words
of a written instrument are used in their ordinary meaning, their
construction presents a question solely of law." The court also said
that when it is necessary in the construction of a tariff to determine
on evidence the peculiar meaning of words or the existence of inci-
dents alleged to be attached by usage to the transaction, the prelimi-
nary determination must be made by the commission before a court
can take jurisdiction.
The conclusion to be drawn from these decisions is, that the
saving clause in Section 201g-18 will not apply where an overcharge
claim involves an administrative question, such as the peculiar mean-
ing of words or the existence of a usage. In this type of cases the
complaint should first be presented to the Railroad Commission under
Section 201g-6 and the two-year period of Section 201g-17 would apply.
If, however, the overcharge claim presents only a question of law,
as is ordinarily the case, the saving clause would be applicable and
the claimant would not be limited to the remedy in Sections 201g-6, but
would have the choice of existing common law or statutory remedies.
The suggestion has been made that an action for the recovery of
overcharges can be maintained on the written contract expressed in
the bill of lading and that the limitation period of fifteen years in
Section 2514 is applicable. The bills of lading generally used by the
railroads contain the provision, "subject to the classifications and
5222 U. S. 506, 56 Law. Ed. 288, (1912).
6237 U. S. 121, 59 Law. Ed. 867, (1915).
'259 U. S. 285, 66 Law. Ed. 943, (1922).
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tariffs in effect on the date of the issue of the Bill of Lading." While
this provision may by contract fix the amount of the freight charges
to be paid by the shipper, it does not follow that if a greater amount
is paid, the carrier is bound by the written contract to refund the
overpayment.
The carrier is, however, bound by an implied contract to make
such refund.8 On this obligation the provisions of Section 2515 apply.
This statute provides that an action upon an implied contract shall be
commenced within five years next after the cause of action accrued.
Section 2515 would also be applicable if the action be founded
upon mistake, and in addition thereto the claimant could invoke the
aid of Section 2519, which reads: "In actions for relief for fraud or
mistake, or damages for either, the cause of action shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud or mistake;
but no such action shall be brought ten years after the time of mak-
ing the contract or the perpetration of the fraud."
It has been held, however, that this statute runs from the time
the mistake, by ordinary diligence, ought to have been discovered As
the railroads are required by Section 201g-3 of the Statutes to keep
their tariffs on file for public inspection, a shipper by reasonable dili-
gence should discover the mistake at the time the charges are paid.
The benefits to be derived from Section 2519 are accordingly remote.
In conclusion it is submitted that an action for the recovery of
charges in excess of tariff rates is ordinarily barred in five years from
the date the charges are paid. If, however, the action presents an
administrative question, such as the peculiar meaning of words or
the existence of a usage, it is barred in two years unless complaint
has previously been presented to the Railroad Commission.
J. E. M Axs.
CONTRACTS-USURY.
A-Early History.
Originally usury meant the reserving of any interest for the use
of money.' Usury has been recognized and condemned since the
earliest times, being prohibited by the early laws of China, in the
Hindu Institute of Menu, and the Koran of Mohammed.2 The taking
of usury was an offense at Common Law, and the usurer was not only
punished by the censures of the church in his life time, but was denied
8 Cullen v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, (1912).
'Provident Assurance Soc. v. Withers, 132 Ky. 541, 116 S. W. 350,
(1909).
'Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Student 's Ed. 1928;
Ex Parte Berger, 193 M. 16, 90 S. W. 759, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 530
(1905);
Marshall v. Beeler, 104 Kan. 32, 178 Pac. 245, (1919);
2Chancellor Kent; Durham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 376, (1819).
